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Abstract. Security mechanisms are essential for business processes. Cur-
rently, business-process-management systems (BPMSs) provide relatively
little security support, and programmers must be familiar with interfaces
of security mechanisms that are not part of BPMSs. Enforcing secu-
rity constraints for a business process leads to high implementation and
maintenance costs. Our approach in turn is a wholistic one, providing
security support from the modelling to the runtime phase of a business-
process lifecycle. As current security-modelling approaches lack features
important for business processes, we propose a sophisticated language to
formulate respective constraints. In addition, we considerably ease the
specification of how users can control their security preferences at run-
time. Our security language is embedded in BPMN. We have extended
an open-source BPMS on the modelling, configuration and execution
layer. The BPMS extensions transform BPMN schemas with security
constraints into executable secure processes in a versatile manner. Our
language is sufficiently broad, because we have systematically realized
all requirements identified in a complex, real-world scenario.
Keywords: process modelling, security, user centricity
1 Motivation
Security facets like authorization, authentication, integrity, and confidentiality of
data are essential for business processes in service-oriented architectures (SOA).
Currently, business-process-management systems (BPMSs) do not support these
aspects in an adequate way. From the functional perspective, BPMSs offer some
security mechanisms, but not the full range. Next, programmers tend to embed
security functionality (e.g., encryption) into BPMSs by hand. However, BPMSs
should offer integrated security mechanisms which are easy to use and maintain.
[14], among others, proposes to attach security constraints to business-process
models. The aim is to provide a shared communication base for managers, system
designers, security experts, and programmers. But existing security vocabularies
are not sufficiently comprehensive. For instance, one cannot represent delegation
mechanisms for data-access credentials in SOA. Further, the vocabularies enable
the specification of high-level security goals, but rarely allow for detailed con-
straints within the process model. To illustrate, some existing approaches allow
to represent confidentiality as a security goal, but there usually is no way to
specify which realization alternative to use.
A further issue is that, with respect to security and trust in business pro-
cesses, user involvement is important. With conventional approaches, users spec-
ify their security-specific preferences a priori, such as “who is allowed to access
their data” or the trust level of service providers which may process their data.
However, they should be able to specify their preferences at runtime, a feature
we refer to as user involvement. This is because preferences tend to vary for dif-
ferent instances of a process, because their contexts are different. For example,
think of a user selecting a service provider for processing his personal data from
the services available. It is tedious to model such user involvements explicitly,
and it requires specific knowledge about security, trust, and privacy. For exam-
ple, to specify the selection of a service deemed trustworthy by the user, we had
to model around 10 activities, including user interactions consisting of several
steps [1].
Another shortcoming of most existing approaches is that an embedding into
an infrastructure for execution of processes is not described.
Thus, one research issue is to specify a security language representing a com-
prehensive set of security features for business processes in SOA, and this lan-
guage should be embedded into a process-modelling language. This is challeng-
ing: It calls for a systematic analysis of functional requirements. An example
for an issue that remains to be specified is the delegation of access rights to
business-process-internal and external data in SOA. The language envisioned
has to be all-embracing to enable the transformation into executable processes
without any human intervention. A further challenge is to identify a canonical
set of security-specific user involvements and to provide support at the modelling
layer. Yet another issue is how to extend a BPMS with security components in
a generic way, so that an automatic transformation becomes feasible.
Contributions. (1) We propose a language that is sufficiently broad and
deep to represent security constraints. It also supports security-specific user in-
volvements, which we have identified systematically. An evaluation with two
real-world scenarios has demonstrated that it is sufficiently general [1]. To con-
tinue the above example, process designers can specify the security aspects of a
service selection by one annotation term with few parameters.
We embed our language in BPMN. The BPMN 2.0 standard itself does not
support security aspects. However, it provides so-called artifacts to facilitate
comments within business processes [11]. By using BPMN artifacts as containers
for constraints, our approach is BPMN 2.0 standard conform at a syntax level.
This has reduced the implementation effort necessary from our side.
(2) We have observed that there are three different kinds of targets when
transforming our security constraints: security policies at an abstraction level
comparable to the one of XACML, adaptations of the process schema, and pa-
rameter settings for invocations of security components. By describing the trans-
formation, we demonstrate that different constraint types have different kinds
of targets. Regarding realization, dedicated components of our extended BPMS
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transform the security-enhanced business-process models into executable BPEL
processes. These components assign users to tasks, enforce process-specific secu-
rity policies, and manage security-relevant variables of the business process.
In summary, our approach supports process designers and programmers by
providing a broad range of integrated security functionality.
Paper outline: Section 2 describes security requirements for business pro-
cesses. Section 3 introduces the security language, Section 4 describes the trans-
formation and enforcement components. Section 5 discusses related work, and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Requirements
The following requirements, collected in an earlier study for the employability
domain [9], form the basis of our security language.
Authorization regulates which users may execute activities or access the process
data. Respective mechanisms have to ensure that access rights hold exactly for
the execution time of the activities in question. Further, authorization to control
adaptations of running process instances in an ad-hoc manner should be possible.
Such rights to adapt a process are useful, for example, when a data owner wants
to see who has accessed his personal data, though the process does not support
this activity. Authorization also implies role management, i.e., the specification
which role holders may perform which activities, and the direct assignment of
individuals to tasks. Since business processes typically connect activities, we
see further challenges in the coordination of access control with the process flow.
This implies the possibility to separate and to bind duties. The latter is desirable
in order to obtain clear responsibilities for related activities. We need delegation
mechanisms to transfer access rights to data, in our context the transfer of
credentials for data. This is for the following reasons. First, it must be possible
to delegate credentials from the business process to web services, which might
require particular rights to access external data stores. Further, if data objects
are protected by particular access policies, there might be a need to delegate
credentials for data to other process participants.
Authentication ensures that a system identifies actors correctly. An actor can be
a human, but also another process. It is challenging for system architects to pro-
vide authentication in open, distributed, inter-organizational environments, in
the presence of single-sign-on mechanisms (SSO) in particular. In such settings,
architects typically rely on federated identity-management systems where iden-
tity providers (IDPs) authenticate individuals and provide certified attributes
about them.
Auditing means that the system monitors the business process in order to pro-
vide traceability. Typically, compliance regulations frame auditing constraints.
Auditing can affect any aspect of business processes. For example, execution
of individual activities as well as the message flow may be monitored. Further,
access to data or to external services as well as role assignments can be logged.
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Confidentiality is the protection of data in business processes against access at-
tempts that are not allowed. This includes calls of external web services. Autho-
rization constraints already are a first step towards confidentiality, but additional
mechanisms are needed, such as encryption.
Data Integrity is commonly perceived as another security goal [5]. It means
consistency, accuracy and correctness of data. To illustrate, a system has to
establish data integrity when business processes terminate exceptionally, due to
the occurrence of some events, such as errors.
Up to now, we have summarized the functional requirements from [9]. We
now motivate that our language cover user involvements dealing with security
issues. For instance, data owners might interactively agree to access of their
data and to terms and conditions referring to the process. Modelling security-
specific user involvements as part of the application logic would require detailed
security knowledge and would result in complex models. Thus, our language has
to support the specification of security-specific user involvements, and the BPMS
security extensions have to manage them.
Further, business processes couple web services that users may deem more
or less trustworthy. As trust is commonly perceived as a facet of security, we
also consider trust-specific aspects in business processes. In our context, trust
is, e.g., the reputation a service provider has gained in the past. BPMSs have to
facilitate the selection of web services dynamically, depending on the trust level
of service providers. To illustrate, a data holder might have specified a level of
trust service providers accessing his data must have, but now has to modify it,
because his specifications cannot be fulfilled otherwise.
The requirements discussed so far are the basis for our security language that
we introduce next.
3 Modelling Security Constraints for Business Processes
Our security language is embedded in BPMN 2.0 as structured text annotations.
The aim is to represent security constraints in business processes declaratively.
Having identified all security requirements of business processes of two complex
real-world scenarios in the employability domain in SOA environments, our lan-
guage covers all these issues, i.e., the requirements from the previous section.
This chapter completely specifies our language. We group our language prim-
itives into different categories, namely authorization, authentication, auditing,
data and message flow security, and security- and trust-specific user involve-
ments. The first categories are well-known in the security literature, but not
fully specified in existing approaches for business processes ([4], [12], [15], [14],
[8]). Additionally, we extend authorization constraints by controlling the rights
for process adaptations. Annotations for security- and trust-specific user involve-
ments are a new notion, aiming to support user centricity.
Annotations have the following generic structure:
 Annotation term: list(parameter-name=“value”) 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For example,BoD is a simple annotation term, specifying a binding of duty
(BoD) constraint. The security annotations require no, one, or many parameter-
name/value-pairs, dependent on the term. Some are optional in certain cases.
If nothing else is said in the following, the parameter values are “string” data
types.
Each annotation term is defined for a particular set of BPMN 2.0 elements,
e.g., for activities, lanes, data objects, data stores, or message flows. According
to the BPMN standard, an activity can be a simple task or a sub-process.
We now describe the annotation terms for authorization, authentication, au-
diting, data and message flow security, and security-specific user involvements
in detail.
3.1 Authorization Constraints
The authorization constraints (Table 1) specify who possesses which rights under
which restrictions. The dots in Table 1 stand for missing parameters. To manage
authorizations, we apply roles, i.e., we specify access rights for role holders.
Auth. Constraint Syntax
Role Assignment Assignment: type=“Role” ... 
Assignment Mechanism Assignment: type=“Mechanisms” ... 
User Assignment Assignment: type=“User” ... 
Separation of Duty SoD: ... 
Binding of Duty BoD: ... 
Delegation Delegation: ... 
Adaptation Adaptation: ... 
Table 1. Overview of Authorization Constraints
Role assignment. The term
 Assignment: type = “Role′′ name = “$rolename′′ 
assigns a role to an activity, to a group of activities, to pools, or to lanes. It
means that users with the given role are allowed to execute activities.
If no role name is specified, the annotation implies that the pool or lane name
determine the role name. Clearly, this option is only possible for the annotation
of pools or lanes and means that users holding role poolname or lanename are
allowed to perform tasks of the annotated pool or lane. In particular cases, if
the role name differs from the name of pools and lanes, pools and lanes are
annotated with a role name. In these cases, role is an obligatory parameter. A
role assignment with the parameter/value-pair name = “$rolename′′ is typically
used for the annotation of activities or group of activities, indicating that role
holders of rolename have to perform annotated activities. For simplification,
each BPMN element can be annotated only by one role name. In case that many
roles are required, the process modeller adapts the role name accordingly (e.g.,
by introducing an additional role name representing all required roles).
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Example: Figure 1 shows two role assignments for lane “placement coordina-
tor” and lane “learner” for a student-placement scenario. This means that lane
“placement coordinator” and lane “learner” represent roles.
Fig. 1. Example Security Annotations for Process Start Event
An assignment mechanism specifies the assignment of work items to role
holders. We specify a mechanism to be used as follows:
 Assignment: type=“Mechanism” name = “$mechanismname′′ 
The mechanismname indicates the mechanisms to be used. A mechanism can
be specified for roles, activities, group of activities, and for pools and lanes.
For example, an employability company preferably assigns clerks to a cus-
tomer case who have already gained experience with that applicant/customer. By
supporting the specification of different assignment schemes (e.g., “assignment
to role holders with the most experience”, or “shortest execution time”), allo-
cation of role holders becomes more flexible, as opposed to role holders picking
up items from a work list. We facilitate the specification of assignment schemes
in the process model, because they are application-specific. A mechanism can
be specified for any BPMN elements with a corresponding role assignment. As
roles are not part of BPMN, we allow the indirect assignment of mechanisms
to roles in BPMN diagrams as follows: (1) pools or lanes represent roles (ex-
pressed by a role assignment) and are annotated with a mechanisms assignment
accordingly. (2) activities or group of activities that have to be performed by
a role (specified by an annotated role assignment) can be annotated addition-
ally with a mechanism assignment. Such twofold annotations will be interpreted
accordingly.
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User Assignment. Our language also allows for direct user assignment (Ta-
ble 1). A user “username′′ (process participant) is assigned explicitely to an
activity or a group of activites by the annotation
 Assignment: type=“User” name = “$username′′ 
This means that the user “username′′ has the rights to perform the annotated
activities. Typically, individual users are not assigned to particular tasks because
a users’ absence blocks the process execution. Consequently, this assignment has
to be used only for exceptional cases.
Separation of Duty. The annotations separation of duty (SoD) and bind-
ing of duty (BoD) specify dependencies of process activities. They constrain
authorizations for a group of activities (or for multiple instances of an activity),
to be performed by different individuals (SoD) or by the same one (BoD).
The annotation
 SoD: role =′′ $rolename′′ number = “$value′′ threshold =′′ $value′′ 
enforces separation of duty. We offer various possibilities for the specification:
Without the optional parameter/value pair role = “$rolename′′, it must be sim-
ply ensured that the annotated objects (typically activities) must be performed
by different role holders. The specification role = “$rolename′′ excludes role
holders of “rolename” to perform the activities. With the optional parameters
number = “$value′′ and threshold = “$value′′ (both of type integer) we specify
the minimum number of different users (number) that have to perform activ-
ity/activities and a threshold value of the sum of activity instances a user is
allowed to perform (these cardinalities are adapted from [15]).
We allow the “separation of duty” annotation (Table 1) for activities, groups
of activities, pools, and lanes. A SoD constraint for several lanes forbids the
allocation of a user to several roles. It holds for all activities of the pool or lane.
Example: A setting in the employability context where a SoD constraint is
meaningful is as follows: A placement coordinator cannot carry out his own
placement as learner (see Figure 1).
Binding of Duty. The concept of binding of duty constraints by the term
 BoD: spec = “weak′′ 
that (typically) a group of activities will be performed by the same user. Such a
restriction is desirable in order to obtain clear responsibility for a related set of
activities. The annotation BoD is defined for activities, group of activities,
and pools and lanes. Usually, a set of activities or a group of activities is specified
by a BoD constraint. In the particular case, if only one activity is annotated, SoD
constraints for loops or activity instances of a process are described. The default
case is without the parameter spec. To avoid blocked process instances due to
absence of process participants, we allow to ease BoD constraints by enabling
the explicit transfer of responsibility i.e., re-assignment for activities. Note that
we do not use the term delegation here, since delegation has a different meaning
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later. If the optional parameter spec = “weak′′ is specified, a re-assignment of
activities is possible, otherwise not.
To avoid process blocking because users are absent, we allow to ease BoD
constraints by explicit transfer of responsibility, i.e., re-assignment of activities.
The optional parameter spec = “weak′′ specifies this.
Example: The BoD annotations in Figure 1 mean that an individual learner
cannot pass responsibility to carry out activities to other role holders of learner,
while a re-assignment of activities of placement coordinators is possible.
Delegation. Process participants can delegate credentials to someone who
currently does not have the authorization. In our context, delegation handles
access rights to data which is external or is controlled by the same process; see
the data handling in BPMN 2.0 [11]. Delegation varies depending on the category
of the data concerned and therefore requires varying parameters. We see the
following two categories: A data object is local to the process, and its lifetime
is bound to the process where it is defined and used; data stores are external
data sources which persist beyond the lifetime of a process. For instance, this
could be a personal data store (PDS) or a database. For internal and external
data, there might exist access restrictions. Rules to access data stores are often
specified using external mechanisms, Access rights to data objects have to be
defined explicitly within the BPMS. Using the data during the process can have
the effect that changing role holders execute the tasks accessing the data, or that
external services called need to access external data for using it a role holder is
authorized but not the service itself. These are situations requiring delegation
of access rights or credentials.
An example of how to use a data store is the following: The business process
needs access to data in a PDS of a certain role holder. To this end, the role
holder can specify a respective view on his PDS, together with an access policy,
represented as a protected reference to that view and the policy, e.g., in form of
a token. The process can then use this token to delegate the access rights to a
web service invoked.
The annotation
 Delegation: rights = “$rightsname′′ object = “$objectname′′
interval = “($activityname1, $activityname2)|$group′′ role = “$rolename′′
poolname = “$poolname′′|“$lanename′′ ws = “$webservicetypename′′
spec = “$specification′′ 
specifies the delegation of access rights to data, with pre-defined vocabulary:
read, write, delete, or policy. If there is a delegation of access rights which are
attached to the data object in form of a policy, the “rights” parameter is optional,
but in this case the “object” parameter is required. The following parameters
are optional: resource, role, poolname, ws, spec.
The specified rights or the use of the object with a related policy are del-
egated. The rights describe which use of $objectname is allowed. The delega-
tion is valid for the execution time of activities in the interval [$activityname1,
$activityname2], i.e., the part of the process starting with $activityname1 and
ending with $activityname2, or contained in the $group of activities. The dele-
gate is either a rolename, a poolname, a lanename, or a webservicename.
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Optionally, the parameter spec denotes a delegation with grant rights for the
delegate.
Example: Figure 2 shows a process activity dealing with a personal data
store. The annotation Delegation ... gives credentials for the “$View-PDS-
of-Learner” from role “Placement coordinator” to the web service “PDS”.
Fig. 2. Example Security Annotations for Process Activity
For the annotation of data, the rights read, write, and delete are possible.
The right to write data can also be used to create data objects.
Adaptations. To give way to ad-hoc process changes, but in a controlled way,
we allow the specification of rights to adapt process instances. (Annotation
adaptation in Table 1). With
 Adaptation: rights = “$rightsname′′ role = “$rolename′′
pre = “$precondition′′ post = “$postcondition′′ 
we give rights to adapt (i.e., to migrate) process instances. By means of the
parameters role = “$rolename′′ and rights = “$rightsname′′ (the predefined
vocabulary for rights is insert, update, delete) we specify which role holders
have particular rights to adapt the process at the annotated position. Further,
we specify pre- and postconditions with the parameters pre and post that must
hold for process modifications. Consequently, role holders with the appropriate
rights can trigger and migrate running process instances. For example, a student
in an e-learning scenario wants to see who accessed his personal data, although
the process does not support this activity. Or a coach might decide that a student
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has to pass further exams, which are not foreseen yet. With the rights to adapt
(migrate) the process, both users can adapt the process instance according to
their needs. Adaptation rights are defined for any BPMN elements (activities,
group of activities, pools and lanes, data, message flows, and events).
From the realization point of view, these activities are managed as abstract
web services and are maintained typically as process fragments in particular
repositories. When users want to plug-in non-foreseen process parts (single ac-
tivities or sub-processes) into the process, they can select the appropriate process
fragments accordingly.
In our approach, we additionally support a second way for process adapta-
tions. The annotation of user involvements dealing with security and trust issues
lead to modifications of the process model. We describe this in Section 3.5 and
Section 4.3).
Table 2 summarizes the allowed authorization constraints.
Annotation Term Roles Activ. Gr. of Activ. Pools&Lanes Data Messagef. Events
Role Assignment - X X X - - -
Assignment
Mechanism
X X X X - - -
User Assignment - X X X - - -
Binding of Duty - X X X - - -
Separation of
Duty
- X X X - - -
Delegation - X X X - X -
Adaptation - X X X X X X
Table 2. Allowed Authorization Annotations
3.2 Authentication
The annotation  Authn: attribute= list(“attributename′′, “value′′)
idp = “$identityprovider′′ 
means that process participants must be authenticated and identified. The task
of an identity provider (IDP) is to certify attributes of process participants.
This certification leads to authentications. For this purpose, we specify a list of
attributes which a particular identity provider (IDP) can certify. For instance,
any holder of role “learner” in Figure 1 must be authenticated as a student at
the University of Nottingham and identified by an identity provider given or a
related one. The termAuthn can be annotated for roles and pools and lanes
(which will be interpreted as roles). In the first case, a twofold annotation (see
discussions mechanisms assignment) is needed.
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3.3 Auditing
The annotation  Audit: policy = “$policyname′′ 
enforces a monitoring of the execution of an activity, a group of activities, data
access, event, or message flow.
Various legal requirements call for different logging activities. For example, if
a process handles personal data, it must be logged, among others, who performed
which action upon which data, and at which time [2]. Thus, we specify the
objects to be logged in an auditing policy (parameter policy = “$policyname′′).
To illustrate, we have annotated the process “start event” with the annotation
term Audit in Figure 1. This specifies a monitoring of consenting to terms and
conditions at the process start according to the policy “auditAll”.
3.4 Data and Message Flow Security
Confidentiality. Authorization mechanisms support a basic level of confiden-
tiality, because only authorized humans or web services may perform activities
and access data. To improve confidentiality further, the system can also protect
message flows. This can be expressed by:
 Conf: spec=“$value” 
We allow the parameter “spec”. Its possible values are “encrypted′′ or “signed′′.
For example, the data flow from activity “Import personal data to PDS” to
activity “PDS” in Figure 2 must be encrypted.
Integrity. The annotation  Integrity 
means that data integrity must be enforced. We allow the annotation of data
(i.e., data objects, data stores, data inputs, data outputs) and message flows.
Table 3 summarizes the usage of these annotation terms.
Annotation Term Roles Activ. Gr. of Activ. Pools&Lanes Data Messagef. Events
Authentication X - - X - - -
Auditing - X X X X X X
Confidentiality - - - - - X -
Integrity - - - - X X -
Table 3. Allowed Annotations for other Security Goals
3.5 User Involvements
By studying real-world applications that handle personal data in particular, we
have identified user involvements that are specific in the security and trust con-
text. These user involvements are important, because users have to specify and
agree at runtime to security preferences that are context-specific. Having ex-
amined various application scenarios, we have identified the following security-
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and trust-specific user involvements: giving consent, selecting services according
to required trust levels, specifying data access policies or trust levels, specifying
users’ interaction preferences (i.e., their preferred degree of direct involvement in
security issues), and trust-feedback mechanisms. To support the representation
of such involvements, we introduce annotation terms to specify them declara-
tively. Thus, the process designer simply annotates user involvements instead of
modelling them explicitly. We now describe the annotation terms that represent
security-specific user involvements.
The representation is as follows:
 UInvolve:list(parameter-name=value) 
Each user involvement has a parameter of name type, and its value specifies the
intention of a user, e.g., type = consent means giving user consent. Table 4 lists
our language for security- and trust-specific user involvements. Dots indicate
further parameters, such as specification of users’ interaction preferences, giving
user consent or trust feedback, service selection, specification of a data policy,
trust policy setting or selection. We can annotate activities and some events
of a process model with user involvements. Unless specified otherwise, these
involvements are invoked before the annotated activity takes place. To deal with
other cases, there is a parameter insertplace, indicating the position of the
involvement in the flow of the process.
User Involvement Syntax
Set Interaction Preferences UInvolve: type=“SetIAPref” ... 
Give Consent UInvolve: type=“Consent” ... 
Service Selection UInvolve: type=“Select Service” ... 
Set Data Access Policy UInvolve: type=“SetDataPolicy” ... 
Select Data Access Policy UInvolve: type=“SelectDataPolicy” ... 
Set Trust Policy UInvolve: type=“SetTrustPolicy” ... 
Select Trust Policy UInvolve: type=“SelectTrustPolicy” ... 
Give Trust Feedback UInvolve: type=“TrustFeedback” ... 
Table 4. Overview of User Involvements
Set Interaction Preferences. The annotation of the first line in Table 4
specifies the interaction preferences of a user for a business process. These pref-
erences may concern, for example, data access, or preferred interaction behavior
concerning web-service selection.
With the annotation
 UInvolve: type = “SetIAPref ′′ display = “list($option)′′
role = “$rolename′′ insertplace = “$activityname′′ 
a user can specify its preferences with respect to interactions for a business
process. These preferences may concern, for example, data access, or its preferred
interaction behavior concerning web service selection. The parameters role and
insertplace are optional.
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The annotation is illustrated by the following example:
 UInvolve: type = “SetIAPref ′′ display =“data: allowAll,allow individuals,
allow none”; “web service selection: ask anytime, do not ask”. 
Example: A user selects his interaction preferences from the options “ask
me anytime” or “do not interrupt me” in case that security issues occur during
process execution.
User Consent. Due to legal regulations, user consent for privacy terms is
needed when personal data is managed (Table 4). Process designers have this
domain knowledge and can represent it accordingly. Process modeller have this
application knowledge and can represent this requirement accordingly.
The annotation
 UInvolve: type = “Consent′′ target = “$targetname of privacy terms”
role = “$rolename′′ insertplace = “$activityname′′
display = “$option1, ..., option
′′
n 
specifies that a user must give consent to some privacy terms, otherwise the
process ends. The target identifies the particular privacy terms that must be
accepted by a user (type string), display specifies the displayed text of a user
interface a user can choose for agreement.
For illustration, we give a brief example where a user has to choose between
“yes” and “no” of the TAS3 Privacy Terms:
 UInvolve: type = “Consent′′ target = “TAS3PrivacyTerms′′
display = “yes, no′′. 
Example: Figure 1 shows two annotated user involvements aiming to consent
to the placement process as well as to privacy terms when the process starts.
Service Selection. The term
 UInvolve: type = “SelectService′′ display = “list($option)′′
insertplace = “$activityname′′ role = “$rolename′′ 
means that the user who performs the annotated activity should first be asked
to select a service with a specific trust level from the set of available services.
A service-discovery mechanism using trust characteristics of services obtains
the available services in advance. The result is shown to the user, in line with
the variable display = “list($option)′′. Optionally, the process modeller can
specify a role name, stating that a holder of the role has to select the service. A
prerequisite for service discovery is that a user has specified his trust policy (see
below).
Example: Figure 2 contains three user involvements, one representing a ser-
vice selection. A learner or a placement coordinator has to select one of the
services available.
Data-Access Policy. When a process manages sensitive data, the data
owner can select security policies for this data. This can be specified either by
user involvements of type “Set Data Policy” or of type ”Select Data Policy”,
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Set Data Policy. The annotation
 UInvolve: type = “SetDataPolicy′′ role = “$rolename′′
name = “$policyname′′ target = “$namesensitivedata′′
insertplace =′′ $activityname′′ 
sets a data policy. The parameters role and insertplace are optional.
 UInvolve: type = “SetDataPolicy′′ target = “e− portfoliodata′′
name = “allowAll′′ 
gives the rights for e-portfolio data of a user.
Select Data Policy. The annotation term
 UInvolve: type = “SelectDataPolicy′′ target = “$nameofsensitivedata′′
display = “option1, option2, ..” 
enables that a user specifies a security policy for access to his sensitive data by
selecting from a policy list. As parameters, we have target=“name of sensitive
data” (type string) and display=“option1, option2,..” (of type list of strings).
The following example illustrates the annotation:
 UInvolve: type = “SelectDataPolicy′′ target = “e− portfoliodata′′
role = “$rolename′′ insertplace = “$activityname′′
display = “denyAll, allowRead, allowAll′′. 
The user can decide whether all process participants are denied or allowed to
access its e-Portfolio data. Process modeller can also consider the case that data
policies might be too restrictive. In this case, potential process adaptation by
means of a modification of data policies can be modelled.
Trust Policies. We characterize service providers by trust levels, represent-
ing their reputation gained in the past. Process participants can specify the
minimum trust level of service providers by means of a trust policy. Users can
either set (i.e., specify) or select trust policies interactively from a list (see lines
6 and 7 in Table 4).
Set Trust Policy. A trust policy will be set (i.e., initialized or modified) in a
process instance by the annotation
 UInvolve: type = “SetTrustPolicy′′ name = “$policyname′′
role = “$rolename′′ insertplace = “$activityname′′. 
The parameter name identifies the trust policy to be used.
The following example illustrates the setting of the trust policy “trustAll”:
 UInvolve: type = “SetTrustPolicy′′ name = “trustAll′′ 
Select Trust Policy. The following annotation specifies the selection of a trust
policy:
 UInvolve: type = “SelectTrustPolicy′′ display = “list(option)′′ 
For example, the following options can be selected by a user:
 UInvolve: type = “SelectTrustPolicy′′ display =
“trustAll, averageFeedback,mostreputableUsers, 5mostreputableUsers′′ 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Example: The user involvement of type “SelectTrustPolicy” in Figure 2 means
that a learner has to select a trust policy from the available options.
Trust Feedback. The annotation
 UInvolve: type = “TrustFeedback′′ display = “list(option)′′
role = “$rolename′′ insertplace = “$activityname′′ 
means that users who hold the role calling the web service are asked for feed-
back about its trustworthiness. Here, we have parameter insertplace. It specifies
where exactly in the process model users give feedback. The parameter role is
optional.
Example: The annotation
 UInvolve: type = “TrustFeedback′′
display = “positive, neutral, negative, nofeedback′′
insertplace = “$activityname′′ 
means that users can pick a feedback value from the options listed. This user
involvement will be triggered before activity activityname executes.
Table 5 summarizes how user involvements can be annotated in BPMN dia-
grams.
User Involve-
ment
Roles Activ. Gr. of Activ. Pools&Lanes Data Messagef. Events
Set Interact.
Preferences
- X X - - - X
Give Consent - X X - - - X
Service Selection - X X - - - -
Set Data Access
Policy
- X X - - - X
Select Data Ac-
cess Policy
- X X - - - X
Set Trust Policy - X X - - - X
Select Trust Pol-
icy
- X X - - - X
Give Trust Feed-
back
- X X - - - -
Table 5. Allowed Annotations for User Involvements
In summary, our language represents security aspects and security- and trust-
specific user involvements. Having taken into account all requirements from two
complex, realistic application scenarios, we argue that our language is the result
of a more comprehensive design effort than previous ones.
4 Transformation of Security Annotations
In this section, we describe how we transform our security annotations of the
BPMN model to the execution level. A BPMS enhanced with BP-specific security
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components, see Section 4.1, executes the resulting BPMN model. Depending on
different constraint types, we have identified three different kinds of targets and
explain the specifics of the respective transformations.
4.1 Secure Business-Process-Management Systems
A common security framework, not confined to business processes, is the XACML
framework [10]. It is a declarative access-control policy language implemented
in XML. The processing model of XACML contains the following components:
a policy-decision point (PDP), to check against a (PDP-)specific security policy
whether certain operations are allowed, a policy-enforcement point (PEP) to
intercept access requests and to enforce the decision of a PDP, and a policy-
information point (PIP) to provide further security information for PDP and
PEP. A security framework of a heterogeneous environment additionally requires
a federated identity framework with Identity Providers (IdP), to identify and
authenticate users. Finally, further components, e.g., to manage trust with a
trust PDP, or to support auditing by means of an auditing bus, are needed.
The BP-specific security requirements of Section 2 necessitate the refinement
of the components of the XACML processing model. We refer to the new com-
ponents as BP-PEP, BP-PDP and BP-PIP. In particular, the components have
to take into account the history and context of the process instance, to, say, bind
duties to a specific role holder, or to ensure that access rights hold exactly for
the execution time of the activities in question. Further, assignment of users to
activities must take the history into account; this also holds for authorization
constraints, such as BoD and SoD. The use of credentials is essential for service
calls which the process performs for a specific user. In this case, the business
process must delegate the necessary rights to the service called, e.g., to access
the external data store.
The right-hand side of Figure 3 shows the main components of a BPMS at
the execution level. according to the OASIS standard of the workflow manage-
ment coalition [17]: the business-process engine, the tool agent invoking external
applications, e.g., web services and other processes. and the BP user interface
with a worklist handler and binding of client applications, i.e., typically web
interfaces to users. The administration and monitoring tool component, which
is typically a BP-external component, and the design component, see Figure 4,
are not part of this figure. To give way to security-specific functionality, we have
modified the BPMS architecture as follows: A dedicated security component, the
BP-PEP (business-process-specific policy-enforcement point), handles all inter-
actions with users and with external web services, as a proxy of the BP engine.
With the help of components of the security framework, the BP-PEP identifies
and authenticates each BP user, and it calls web services in a secure way. The
BP-PEP first checks if access rights are sufficient and if the transport has to be
encrypted.
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Fig. 3. Architecture of a secure BPMS
4.2 Business-Process-Security Modelling and Configuration
Component
Figure 4 shows the three phases of the life-cycle of secure processes. The de-
sign phase results in a BPMN model with security annotations. The annotations
containing security constraints are BPMN artifacts. To deal with security an-
notations, we have developed a dedicated tool, the security modelling and con-
figuration component for BP (BP-SMC). It carries out the transformation, as
follows: It takes the annotated BPMN model of the design phase, extracts the
security annotations, and transforms it into an adapted BPMN model and ad-
ditional security information. This is used to configure the BP-specific security
components. In the execution phase the secure BPMS runs instances of the re-
sulting process, enforcing the security constraints. In the following, we describe
Fig. 4. Three Phases of Life-Cycle of Secure Business Processes
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the transformation phase in more detail.
4.3 Transformation Specifics
The transformation of an annotated BP model aims at generating the security
configurations. In a preprocessing step, the BP-SMC tool extracts the security
constraints of the annotations and the specific process context. This generates
Java objects of the process-model elements which are queryable and updatable.
Further, the BP-SMC tool handles conflicts of security annotations. Such con-
flicts may occur due to contradictory annotations, e.g., role specifications of a
pool and of activities of the pool that are not compatible.
The main concern of this phase is the transformation of the security an-
notations to representations which support the enforcement of the constraints
during process execution. We have observed that different security constraints on
business processes need to be transformed in different ways, i.e., have different
outcomes. A transformation has at least one of the following effects:
– generating or modifying a BP-access-control security policy,
– setting parameters to configure security components,
– adapting the business process with process fragments modelled a priori.
BP-security policy: A security policy consists of security rules, such as access
rules or rules protecting the data flow. Business processes control the flow of
tasks. Thus, general security-policy languages, for which XACML is a standard,
are not sufficient. The enhancements include security rules for tasks and flows of
tasks, and constraints related to the process status. We refer to such an enhanced
policy as BP-access-control security policy, or in short as BP-security policy.
A PDP (see Section 4.1) is a standard component in security frameworks
to ensure access restrictions. Therefore, we argue that one should map these
security annotations to such policies.
The transformation in this category results in an access-control security pol-
icy in XACML, enhanced with business-process specific constructs: In particular,
security constraints may refer to tasks and relationships between tasks, as well
as to references to the execution history and the status of the business process.
During process execution, the BP-PDP checks if any access to tasks and data
conforms to those rules. Taking the execution history into account requires a
PDP more flexible than the ones currently available.
Example: Think of a BoD constraint that is part of the BP-security policy.
It defines the part of the process BoD is valid for, and the role it holds for.
The transformation of Annotation BoD: spec=“weak” of the Placement
Coordinator lane in Figure 1 results in additional rules (in this case an extension
of XACML) that become part of the BP-access-control security policy:
< TaskGroupSettings >
< TaskGroupSpecTargetID = “PlacementCoordinatorLane′′
BoD = “true′′weakBoD = “true′′/ >
< /TaskGroupSettings >
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When assigning a holder of role “placement coordinator” to a human task, the
BP-PEP calls the BP-PDP to check if the assignment fulfills the access rules of
the BP-security policy, e.g., whether a BoD constraint has to be fulfilled.
Configuring security components: The second kind of annotation concerns the
parameterization of calls of security-specific components other than the BP-
PDP. The BP-specific security components, in particular, BP-PEP or BP-PIP,
take in account process context like validity periods of security rules, history of
the process flow, or role holders involved in the process. E.g., the context of role
holders consists of properties such as security preferences, policies or identifying
attributes from the IdP.
Specific activities of the process model invoke the security components via
the BP-PEP. These activities are calls going to or coming from external com-
ponents or human activities, as already described in Section 4.1. The context of
those security calls makes it necessary to provide information about the status
and the history of the process instance. The BP-PIP provides this information.
The BP-SMC inserts information taken from those annotations into the BP-PIP,
to facilitate parameterization of security calls issued by the BP-PEP. This pro-
cedure follows the proposal of security handling in the XACML standardization.
If a component of the security framework enforces constraints of an annota-
tion, its transformation determines parameter values for the component.
Example: Authn: ... will result in an authentication call to an IdP. The
annotation and its context information yield the identifying attributes of the
user in question. As another example, think of a confidentiality annotation
of a web-service task. It specifies parameters to invoke the web service in an
encrypted manner or with a digital signature, see Figure 2. In consequence, the
BP-PEP can set WS-Security-compliant parameters for the WS call, to induce
an execution that is encrypted or digitally signed.
Process adaptation: The third kind of annotation needs an explicit implemen-
tation to enforce it. The implementation is embedded into the business-process
activities, i.e., on the application level, and may involve the actors. In particu-
lar, this is the case for UInvolve annotations which require also interactions
with users. Another example is the Audit annotation. It results in a BP
task calling the audit bus to log access to the annotated BPMN element, e.g.,
the execution of a task or a user interaction.
Our approach regarding this type of annotation is to adapt the process model
by plugging process fragments into it. Such a process fragment includes security-
specific activities. For instance, for each UInvolve annotation, there usually
is more than one fragment. The variants depend on the required behaviour of
the fragment. Adapting the process model occurs before any process instance
starts. But we also provide a certain degree of runtime flexibility allowing to
plug in several branches of security handling, if there are alternatives specified
in the annotation. The choice of the branch depends on user preferences, set
during process execution or according to an existing user preferences policy.
For example, the service-selection annotation in the process part of Figure 2
shows two alternative actors responsible for service selection, the Learner or the
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Placement Coordinator, which results in different process fragments. Using pre-
defined process fragments brings several benefits: The process designers do not
need to be familiar with the specifics of security components. Also, providing
process fragments supports the correct implementation of the annotations.
Example: In the process of Figure 2, a Learner might allow trusted web
services to match her personal e-portfolio data with job offers only to trusted web
services. But there, this activity (i.e., the service call) is only specified without
any trust limitations. To take trust into account for the service selection, the
process designer now can annotate the activity with a UInvolve constraint
of type “SelectTrustPolicy”. The annotation specifies that the Learner can select
one of the options listed in the display parameter:
 UInvolve: type = “SelectTrustPolicy′′ display =
“trustAll, averageFeedback,mostreputableUsers, 5mostreputableUsers′′ 
The process fragment for this user involvement contains the following activ-
ities and user interactions:
– A user interaction, i.e., new tasks to prompt the user and to receive his
input, e.g., the trust policy selected. The web form must contain (links to)
the trust policies available. They have to be parameters of the annotation.
– The BP-PEP calls the web-service discovery with the trust policy selected
as parameter. It returns only web services that are trusted according to the
trust policy.
– In case there is no web service with that trust level, there is a further iteration
of trust-level selection and service discovery.
5 Related Work
Wolter et. al. [15], [16], [14] and Menzel et. al. [8], [7] have presented work on
modelling security for business processes in SOA. [15] focuses on authorization
constraints in BPMN artifacts, but does not cover delegation of data-access
rights, weak BoD, and direct user assignments. Authorization is limited to human
tasks. [16] describes a model-driven transformation of security annotations into
XACML. It allows to relate security annotations to security components. This
is an approach similar to our transformation of annotations to configuration
parameters. The creation of an XACML policy in [16] does not include user
involvements. There also is no counterpart to our transformation resulting in an
adapted process model. [14] extends [15] by a broader security vocabulary. It
also comprises aspects such as integrity and confidentiality. [8] annotates inter-
organizational processes with trust. We have another understanding of trust:
Users specify their desired trust level of web services interactively. The model-
driven approach in [8] translates security constraints into security configurations
in SOA. However, there does not seem to be an implementation for the execution
of processes. [7] defines a process-independent policy language, and provides a
mapping to a design model for security constraints.
[6] proposes an XACML authorization scheme to handle permissions of a
WS-BPEL process, the related role assignment and the associated attributes of
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a role. Further, they introduce a constraint language to specify authorization
constraints for business processes and an RBAC (role-based access control) WS-
BPEL specification with support of human activitites, as well as algorithms for
the enforcement level. In contrast to our approach, they do not focus on secu-
rity facets other than authorization, role assignment and policy checks at the
enforcement level; they also do not consider BPMN. [12] proposes a broad secu-
rity vocabulary for BPMN artifacts. However, it lacks authorization constraints
(such as SoD), and it is less detailed than our language. A model-driven approach
transforms security constraints into implementation specifications [13].
Our language is the first to deal with security-specific user involvements. [3]
represents the control of user dialogs in BPMN. Our work is unique in that we
bundle user interactions, the security-specific tasks and the flow between them.
Finally, our transformation approach differs from existing approaches ([13], [16])
because we have identified three different ways to transform security constraints.
6 Conclusions
We have presented a rich language to represent security constraints for business
processes and provide security support from the modelling to the runtime phase
of a business-process lifecycle. On the modelling, configuration and execution
layer, we have extended an open-source BPMS. The BPMS extensions transform
BPMN schemas with security constraints into executable secure processes in a
versatile manner.
The language supports “classical” security aspects, but also trust- and security-
specific user involvements. Thus, it represents a comprehensive set of security
features for business processes in SOA, and is embedded into a process-modelling
language, i.e., BPMN. We are using so-called artifacts as containers for con-
straints. Thus, our approach is BPMN 2.0 standard conform at a syntactic level.
By describing how to transform our security constraints, we have demon-
strated that there are three different kinds of targets: security policies at an
abstraction level comparable to the one of XACML, adaptations of the process
schema, and parameter settings for invocations of security components. A PDP
allows to check the execution of process tasks and the use of process data against
the resulting access control policy of the business process. To enable security con-
straints beyond access control rules, we enhance the process model with calls to
security components. Particularly, user involvements are challenging in a more
and more user-centric application environment, e.g., to adapt user preferences
related to security. For these complex activities with user interactions, we have
introduced process adaptations based on pre-defined process fragments.
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